Statement to Employees by Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Mike Hayden on Honoring the Victims of 9/11
September 10, 2008
Tomorrow, we mark the seventh anniversary of one of our nation’s most difficult days. To see America under attack, as it was then, is something none of us can ever forget. In an office here at CIA Headquarters, in a unit crucial to the fight against terrorism, a prominent sign still reads: “Today’s date is September 12th, 2001.” That stark, simple reminder speaks to the spirit of determination that defines our Agency. There can be no finer way to honor the victims of 9/11 than to continue working with that full dedication to protect our country and uphold its values of freedom and decency in the world.
Mike Hayden
Remarks by Central Intelligence Agency Director Michael Hayden
at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council
(as prepared for delivery)
Good afternoon. Thanks for that kind introduction, and thank you all for inviting me. It’s a pleasure and privilege to be in Los Angeles and to speak to this Council.
As eventful as the world may be right now, the development that is likely to have the most far-reaching consequences will be a domestic one—the election of a new American president. From the standpoint of the Intelligence Community, it’ll be the first time since 1952 that our top customer will not have served as an incumbent or vice president. It also will be the first transition since the office of Director of National Intelligence was created, and that will be a new experience for all of us.
CIA is the Community’s executive agent in supporting briefings for Senator McCain and Senator Obama, reflecting our role in producing the President’s Daily Brief. After the election, there will be two daily PDB briefings—one for President Bush and another for the president-elect. The new national security team will be setting up shop, too, so it promises to be a very busy time for everyone involved.
The new administration will be a great opportunity for the Agency. I see it as a chance to demonstrate our expertise and insight into virtually every foreign issue affecting this country. We’ll get to know all our new customers and learn how best to serve them. But our fundamental responsibility—protecting the citizens of this nation—will remain the same.
Today I’d like to talk about how CIA keeps America safe from weapons of mass destruction, particularly the nuclear threat. Meeting that critical challenge has been a core responsibility ever since the Agency’s founding in 1947.
In fact, the very first CIA officer to die in the line of duty had been gathering data on the Soviet nuclear program. Douglas Mackiernan served in the desolate reaches of western China, one of those brave operatives who worked our top intelligence target along the periphery of the Soviet Union.
“Mack,” as he was called, was an MIT physics major conversant in Russian and Chinese, a highly resourceful and perceptive officer who had to work with some pretty basic equipment given the remoteness of his post. His primary tasks were to investigate Moscow’s access to local uranium deposits and report any sign of nuclear testing in Soviet Central Asia.
Mackiernan’s mission was cut short by the rapid western advance of the Chinese Communists after their revolution in 1949. He escaped by setting out on an epic seven-month trek across deserts and mountains. He managed to make it all the way to the frontier of Tibet, where he should have found sanctuary. Tragically, he was shot by Tibetan guards who had not yet received word that an American was coming and that he should be granted safe passage.
Douglas Mackiernan’s story speaks to the dedication and courage our officers have brought to our mission for six decades. CIA has targeted the WMD threat in all its forms, from the massive arsenals of rival nations to the deadly aspirations of terrorists. To say that we’re focused on 21st century challenges doesn’t mean for a second that we’ve forgotten those of the 20th—or that we aren’t looking for the emerging threats of tomorrow.
We closely analyze, as we should and as we must, the WMD and missile programs of countries throughout the world. But as attentive as we are in tracking existing weapons programs, the greater challenge lies in detecting those developing in secrecy. CIA is always watching for signs that states and subnational groups might be taking steps to acquire nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.
Our mission is made a lot more difficult by the fact that access to sensitive technologies is no longer the exclusive domain of a few advanced nations. Dual-use technologies and scientific experts travel easily in our global economy, making it critical to follow those movements and know the experts.
But because the materials and expertise are so prevalent and have perfectly legitimate applications, the very fact that someone is interested in nuclear, chemical, or biological technology is not enough to prove they are interested in weapons. A WMD program fundamentally centers on political intent.
By that measure alone, there is no greater national security threat facing the United States than al-Qa‘ida and its associates. Bin Ladin has said repeatedly that he considers acquisition of nuclear weapons “a religious duty.” And we know that al-Qa‘ida remains determined to attack our country in ways that inflict maximum death and destruction.
We are fortunate that those with the clearest intent to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction are also the least capable of developing them. But the potential destruction from an improvised nuclear device—no matter how elementary—is so great that all that really matters to CIA is that we know terrorists are determined to use them.
We fight this threat on two fronts—the supply side and the demand side. CIA has a group devoted to identifying, penetrating, and disrupting WMD-related proliferation networks. That group is at the heart of a highly integrated effort, drawing on the expertise of our own analysts and intelligence collectors and their colleagues throughout government. Together with our foreign partners, we account for and help safeguard WMD and related equipment worldwide. We identify the illegal sellers and buyers of technology and expertise. And we use covert action to disrupt illicit transfers.
At the same time, we work—methodically, patiently, tirelessly—to penetrate and destroy terrorist networks. Operating against both ends of the chain is critical to detecting and defeating any nuclear plot against America or our allies.
CIA also focuses on Iran and North Korea, two states whose WMD programs have threatened US interests, regional stability, and international arms control mechanisms like the Non-Proliferation Treaty. North Korea conducted a nuclear test two years ago, and the Intelligence Community judges their program produced enough plutonium for at least a half-dozen weapons. For its part, Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons eventually. The question is not of capability, but intent.
A good analyst never presumes anything, least of all the plans of a foreign power. Intelligence officers can only assess capability and intent by starting with a clean slate and working from solid evidence and known behavior. That’s precisely what our Community did last year on Tehran’s nuclear program. The result was the Iran National Intelligence Estimate released in November.
The Iran NIE has had its share of criticism, which is typically what happens with a rigorous estimate that lays out what we know and don’t know about a highly contentious issue. It’s detailed, thorough, and—quite frankly—it’s courageous. We don’t have time to delve into the full scope of its findings, but here, very briefly, are the major judgments:
What leads us to this last judgment? Again, it’s a matter of working back from actions. Why are they pushing forward with the uranium enrichment process at Natanz? They say it’s for civilian purposes, and yet they’ve rejected international offers of fissile material under proper controls.
Iran’s behavior, coming as it does after years of nuclear activity they concealed and continue to deny, invites nothing but suspicion. Why are they slow-rolling the International Atomic Energy Agency by not being forthcoming? And why are they willing to defy the United Nations and pay such a heavy price in terms of international isolation?
Those questions sound familiar. One could argue that Iraq under Saddam was just as confrontational and ultimately lacked the weapons we thought were there. But Iran’s leaders saw what happened to Saddam, and still they reject every opportunity to come clean with the world.
North Korea also poses a broad and complex challenge to global arms control. In fact, the WMD problem in Iran is compounded to no small degree by Tehran’s collaboration with North Korea on ballistic missiles.
Pyongyang’s WMD programs present a double threat. As part of North Korea’s arsenal, they endanger the peace and stability of northeastern Asia. As a source of global proliferation, they have been without equal since a joint operation with our British partners took down A.Q. Khan earlier this decade. Like Khan, whose network had been the world’s most dangerous black market supplier of nuclear technology, North Korea asks only two things of its customers: first, can they pay, and second, can they keep a secret.
Thanks to some outstanding intelligence work, we were able last year to spoil a big secret, a project that could have provided Syria with plutonium for nuclear weapons. I’d like to cover it here because it’s an excellent example of how CIA and our Community colleagues attack the problem of nuclear proliferation.
It was reported in the press last April, and you’re probably familiar with its outlines. We knew that North Korea and Syria had been cooperating since the late 1990s in the nuclear field. The depth of that relationship was revealed in the spring of last year, when we identified a nuclear reactor at Al-Kibar in the eastern desert of Syria. It was similar to the one at Yongbyon in North Korea, but with its outer structure heavily disguised.
The situation became critical late last summer, when we judged the facility could be nearing operation. The Al-Kibar reactor was destroyed the morning of 6 September 2007. The Syrians immediately cleared away the rubble and every trace of the building, stonewalling the IAEA when asked to explain. Their cover-up only underlined the intense secrecy of this project and the danger it had posed to a volatile region.
I want to focus briefly on two important aspects of this intelligence effort: the quality of tradecraft, in terms of collection and analysis, and the value of collaboration, both with colleagues in our government and with foreign services.
More than anything else, our work was a classic example of multidisciplinary, blue-collar analysis. We had a group of officers who started working overtime on this issue in April 2007 and kept at it for months. Virtually every form of intelligence—imagery, signals, human source, you name it—informed their assessments, so that they were never completely dependent on any single channel.
For instance, a report from a foreign partner initially identified the structure at Al-Kibar as a nuclear reactor similar to one in North Korea. But even without that piece of the puzzle, it wouldn’t have been long before we reached the same conclusion. We had previously identified the facility on imagery as a suspicious target. When pipes for a massive cooling system were laid out to the Euphrates River in the spring of 2007, there would have been little doubt this was a nuclear reactor. We would have known it was North Korean, too, given the quantity and variety of intelligence reports on nuclear ties between Pyongyang and Damascus.
Still, our analysts were open to alternative possibilities at every juncture. Early on, they applied a methodology that laid out the inconsistencies in each competing hypothesis. They carefully examined whether the building might be for another purpose, like a conventional power plant, or a water treatment facility. In each case, the arguments simply didn’t add up. The reactor hypothesis was the most difficult to refute with the available evidence.
We then stepped back and tried to turn the basic premise on its head: OK, we’ve got a nuclear reactor in Syria built with North Korean help, but is it necessarily for a Syrian program? Might it have been built by North Korea for its own use, to secretly replace the Yongbyon reactor they had pledged to shut down? We took that hypothesis and worked very hard on it, but the mainstream theory held sway.
Finally, this was a success reached through close collaboration across agencies, departments, and governments. Dedicated officers at CIA, DIA, the Department of Energy, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and NSA came together as a team, each bringing a specific expertise to the table. And this was an intelligence problem that required a wide range of knowledge. I already mentioned all the different forms of collection, but it also drew from a remarkable diversity of analytic firepower—everyone from nuclear technology and weapons experts to political and leadership analysts.
Our foreign partnerships too were critical to the final outcome. These relationships aren’t a matter of occasionally passing along a report that may or may not be useful. They’re more akin to working together on a complex equation over a long period. Each tries to solve a variable that in turn helps a partner solve another, and so on until we’ve cracked the case. That’s what good intelligence is all about.
I hope my remarks today have given you a better idea of how CIA is meeting the counterproliferation challenge. The Intelligence Community as a whole has taken great strides since the pre-war NIE on Iraq to strengthen our tradecraft, and I think it shows with both the Iran estimate and the Al-Kibar effort. The rigor of our sourcing, the emphasis on alternative analysis, and the integration of our expertise with those of our colleagues have never been greater.
By history and law, CIA has more connective tissue to the rest of the Intelligence Community than any other organization. We draw on those deep connections and other unique strengths—in human intelligence collection, all-source analysis, and foreign liaison partnerships—to fulfill a single overriding mission: protecting the American people. That remains the ultimate standard by which we measure our success.
I am tremendously proud of the men and women of CIA. They give far more than they get, and deserve far better than they usually receive. Like Doug Mackiernan before them, today’s CIA officers face the same risks, possess the same spirit, and serve the same cause. They accomplish their mission in ways I’m sure would make you proud, too.
Thank you very much.
Unclassified extracts from Studies in Intelligence Volume 52, Number 3 (September 2008)
In Memory of Thomas Francis Troy,
CIA Teacher, historian, 1919-2008 - [PDF 21.6KB*]
Hayden Peake and Nicholas Dujmovic
Amnesia to Anamnesis
Commemoration of the Dead at CIA - [PDF 1.29MB*]
Nicholas Dujmovic
Unraveling a Cold War Mystery
The ALFA SSN: Challenging Paradigms,
Finding New Truths, 1969-79 - [PDF 726KB*]
Gerhardt Thamm
The Youngest Operative
A Tale of Initiative Behind Enemy
Lines During WWII - [PDF 431KB*]
Bob Bergin
Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations
in Chile, 1964-1974 - [PDF 41.0KB*]
David Robarge
The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf - [PDF 190*]
Hayden Peake
* Adobe® Reader® is needed to view Adobe PDF files. If you don't already have Adobe Reader installed, you may download the current version at www.adobe.com (opens in a new window). [external link disclaimer]
Bob Bergin is a former foreign service officer who has spent many years in Thailand. He has written in the history of aviation in Southeast Asia and China and on operations of the OSS in that region.
Nicholas Dujmovic is a CIA historian, veteran intelligence analyst, member of the Studies Editorial Board and a frequent contributor. He is the complier and editor of The Literary Spy.
Hayden Peake is the curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection. He served in the Directorate of Science and Technology and the Directorate of Operations.
David Robarge is the CIA's Chief Historian.He is a frequent reviewer of books and contributor to Studies. He is the author of a number of classified histories, including a biography of former Director of Central Intelligence John McCone.
Gerhardt Thamm served in both Army and Navy intelligence. He was an analyst and team leader in the Office of Naval Intelligence when he wrote the enclosed article. He is now retired.
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations.
In a ceremony held September 18, 2008 at CIA Headquarters, Director Mike Hayden presented the Agency’s Distinguished Intelligence Medal to Maj. Gen. Michael E. Ennis, USMC, who served as the National Clandestine Service’s first Deputy Director for Community Human Intelligence (HUMINT) from May 2006 to August 2008.
In this newly created position, a product of CIA’s expanded HUMINT management responsibilities, Gen. Ennis was responsible for integrating the clandestine HUMINT capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community. This included establishing HUMINT best practices and standards across the Community, and supporting the coordination of vital HUMINT operations designed to protect our nation’s security.
In awarding one of the Agency’s highest honors, Director Hayden paid tribute to Gen. Ennis’ service, saying, “Clearly, Mike’s distinguished record at CIA has been one of moving to contact on some of the most challenging issues we face. Thanks in large part to his energy, pragmatism, expertise, and good humor, we’re making HUMINT collection a joint effort in ways that were hard to imagine before September 2001.”
In March 2007, Director Hayden ordered the creation of the HUMINT Enterprise Board of Governors, a CIA-led body consisting of 31 government organizations that conduct or enable HUMINT operations. Gen. Ennis played a crucial role in the Board’s establishment and crucial work, including a landmark Intelligence Community Directive on HUMINT.
“If there was a single greatest difficulty—or greatest feat—in putting together this enterprise, it was hashing out the Intelligence Community Directive governing how we do HUMINT. That was a tough bureaucratic slog, and Mike was instrumental in reaching consensus and getting it done,” Director Hayden said.
The Distinguished Intelligence Medal is presented for performance of outstanding services or for achievement of a distinctly exceptional nature in a duty or responsibility.
Earlier this month, Gen. Ennis was succeeded by Brig. Gen. Richard T. Ellis, USA.
At the beginning of the Cold War, looking back to the lessons of Pearl Harbor, Congress and President Harry S. Truman approved the creation of a peacetime intelligence service. This new organization, deliberately fashioned to be independent of all the Cabinet departments and military services, was to provide senior U.S. policymakers with comprehensive judgments on political and military issues and to coordinate clandestine activities overseas.
Washington thus created an agency dedicated to collecting and analyzing the secrets of actual or potential adversaries. Intelligence had become an essential permanent component of America’s national security structure.
The U.S. government did not easily embrace worldwide intelligence activities after World War I. Washington had never employed spy networks outside of wartime. But senior planners were concerned and influenced by the global ambitions of the Soviet Union. The recognition that America was facing powerful new threats spurred efforts to maintain clandestine assets and actively seek out enemy secrets.
America's intelligence makeover was more complicated than simply recruiting agents.
The wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS), headed by the dynamic William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan, provided one model for a foreign intelligence organization. The OSS conducted espionage, analysis, covert action and counterintelligence. But, deemed unnecessary and unworkable at war’s end by President Truman, the OSS was disbanded in October 1945. Many of its responsibilities were transferred to the Departments of War and State.
Convinced of the need for an independent intelligence organization, Truman established the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) in January 1946. The CIG, headed by a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), was responsible for “coordination, planning, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence,” as well as the provision of “services of common concern.”
Funding and staff would come from existing government organizations, which would continue to develop their own intelligence products. The military and State Department maintained their independent intelligence capabilities and access to the President and other senior government leaders.
The new DCI, Rear Adm. Sidney S. Souers, with no budget or personnel authority, was hardly in a position to take control of U.S. intelligence. Indeed, observed a 1976 Congressional report, “institutional resistance made implementation virtually impossible. The military intelligence services jealously guarded both their information and what they believed were their prerogatives in providing policy guidance to the President, making CIG's primary mission an exercise in futility.”
Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, appointed DCI in June 1946, brought greater rank, influence and bureaucratic savvy to CIG. Within months, Vandenberg strengthened the analytical Office of Research and Evaluation (ORE) and, flush with funding and personnel authorizations, increased CIG manning by threefold to some 400 employees. At the same time, the CIG received authority to establish a clandestine collection capability.
Building on the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), a War Department organization with former OSS personnel and facilities, DCI Vandenberg created the Office of Special Operations (OSO). By the end of 1946, CIG’s staff topped 1,800. At the highest levels of government, however, the CIG continued to lack influence.
The creation of a truly independent and permanent central intelligence organization focused on strategic issues required legislation. Specifically, the Administration made use of the big military “unification” bill by which Truman sought to modernize what he called America’s “antiquated defense setup.” This bill—the National Security Act of 1947—established a Secretary of Defense and an independent Air Force.
At Vandenberg’s urging, the White House also agreed to include language founding the Central Intelligence Agency. The authorization was brief and unspecific, but the CIA was born.
In 1976, Adolf Tolkachev, a Soviet aviation specialist working on stealth technology for aircraft, began leaving notes in, or on, the cars of U.S. diplomats near the American Embassy in Moscow. He was interested in meeting with CIA officials.
For almost a decade—after finally making that contact—he proved to be a tremendous reporting asset. He provided plans, specifications and test results on existing and planned Soviet aircraft and missiles. The information provided by Tolkachev saved the U.S. government billions of dollars in defense expenditures, a coup that prompted some intelligence historians to call him “the greatest spy since Penkovsky.”
Tolkachev’s espionage ended with his arrest by the KGB on June 9, 1985. On Sept. 25, 1986, a TASS (Russia’s official news agency) news article announced that Tolkachev had been tried, convicted and executed the day before. Although initial suspicion for his arrest fell on former CIA employee and defector Edward Lee Howard, who had been slated to handle Tolkachev while stationed in Moscow, subsequent information revealed that Tolkachev was also betrayed by Aldrich Ames.
For more on Tolkachev, visit “Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky” from Studies in Intelligence.
The fourth Director of Central Intelligence, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith (1950-53), was one of CIA’s most successful and influential directors. A forceful manager with decided ideas about running CIA, Smith:
- Established a permanent system for daily intelligence reporting to the President
- Reorganized CIA missions at a crucial time in its history—the period of the Korean War—and
- Fostered cooperation within the emerging U.S. Intelligence Community.
A generation of Agency leaders following his tenure, and historians since, regard him as having “put CIA on the intelligence map” in terms of visibility and impact.
Smith made significant and durable changes in CIA that substantially improved the effectiveness of operations, support and analysis.
Smith also established a permanent system for providing intelligence support to the White House. Besides the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), which prepared material for Smith’s weekly briefings of President Truman, he launched the new Current Intelligence Bulletin and the Current Intelligence Weekly Review. He tailored these publications for the President and senior policymakers.
After President Truman received the first Bulletin, he wrote, “Dear Bedel [sic], I have been reading the intelligence bulletin and I am highly impressed with it. I believe you have hit the jackpot with this one.” The OCI and these publications continued largely unchanged for 25 years. Smith also established the precedent of providing intelligence briefings to presidential candidates and presidents-elect.
Three months after the North invaded the South, Smith created a Board and Office of National Estimates (BNE and ONE). These groups reported to the DCI. This change assured central oversight of national intelligence. This structure was responsible for producing and coordinating national intelligence estimates for a quarter century and was the forerunner of today’s National Intelligence Council.
Smith was especially determined that CIA should cooperate with Army intelligence in collecting and analyzing information about the conflict in Korea. In 1951, he requested that the National Security Council review how disparate military entities were handling COMINT (communications intelligence), an initiative that led to the creation of NSA.
By the time Smith left the CIA to become President Eisenhower’s Under Secretary of State, the Agency had consolidated the operational and analytical responsibilities it received under the National Security Act of 1947 and had assumed a preeminent status in the Intelligence Community.
According to Walter Pforzheimer, CIA’s original Legislative Counsel,
Smith was the greatest director [but] he doesn’t get the credit . . . General Smith was unbelievable. He really got the Agency firmly established . . . I think others would agree that he was a great Director, but he's not as well known as some others . . . It was very hard to have affection for General Smith, because he was so frosty and so chilly, but he was a very, very great man.
*The Directorate of Plans, established on Aug. 1, 1952, was the forerunner of today’s National Clandestine Service. The Directorate of Administration was established in 1950 and lasted until 2001. In 2001, the Directorate of Administration was replaced with the offices of the Chief Financial Officer, Chief Information Officer, Global Support, Human Resources and Security Mission Support.
We have become not a melting pot but a beautiful mosaic. Different people, different beliefs, different yearnings, different hopes, different dreams.
—Jimmy Carter
The people that make up the Agency’s workforce are much like the beautiful mosaic that President Carter mentions — very diverse. And during Hispanic Heritage Month (September 15-October 15), we celebrate the Hispanic Americans who have devoted their careers to the Agency’s mission.
Hispanic Heritage Month is one of many commemorative months that celebrates the diversity of America’s people. It is also a celebration of the independence of five Latin American countries: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Mexico and Chile also gained their freedom during Hispanic Heritage Month.
This article is the first in a two-part series:
Title: Supervisory Special Agent
Time with the Agency: Five years
Heritage: Cuban
Q: How has your Hispanic heritage been helpful in your job at the Agency?
A: The Agency is a lot more multicultural than I have experienced in other places. It was very easy for me, in that respect, to integrate. My heritage is a factor when I meet people. Some people I meet remark on my background because they themselves are from the Middle East or somewhere else. It helps establish communication. Work wise it’s been good to just open the door to talk to individuals about something other than work. It helps me build a rapport.
My heritage also gives me the opportunity to be a mentor. I have been able to mentor a couple of individuals who sought me out and others who have come by to ask about my career. My heritage helps me branch out from the niche that is my job.
Q: Why do you think commemorative months like Hispanic Heritage Month are important?
A: I think for any cultural group it’s important to have something that focuses them and others to look at and recognize that they exist, they are a part of the fabric of society, and that they do make and continue to make contributions. When we celebrate these special months, they highlight some things that—because they are not yet part of the mainstream—some people may not associate with that particular heritage. It helps to overcome and educate the biases that may be out there. It serves an educational purpose. It serves in another way to help everyone integrate.
Q: How does your Hispanic heritage influence your work ethic?
A: In my particular situation, I started working when I was 10 years old. It was menial work, but it was work that was necessary to help my household. As time went on, it was normal for me. When I joined the military as a volunteer, it was very hard work. But the rewards that I received reinforced my ethic and my desire to work hard. The military helped me continue my education, learn things and go places I never would have otherwise. I received in proportion to what I provided in work. I thought that this was the natural way. But I have to say it originated with the fact that I was working from a very young age and that was expected in my family.
Q: What motivates you to come to work every day? Why do you enjoy working at the Agency?
A: I think the work is very interesting and the mission is very interesting. There are no small issues. A small issue here is a big issue somewhere else. I feel challenged. I feel that I actually contribute to resolving problems, which again goes back to getting satisfaction from your job. If it were all for naught, then I would work from 8 to 4 and collect a pay check and call it day. As it is I come in early and at the end of the day I feel that I have accomplished something important.
Q: How does the diverse workforce at the Agency influence your work and the work of others?
A: The mission of the Agency is global. We all know that in order to complete the mission, you must have diversity. If nothing else, you need a well-educated workforce that can understand issues and address them. A workforce that understands these issues because they have experience with or are native to a certain culture may be able to offer a different view and understanding of a situation. This helps the mission.
I have noticed since my arrival – out of necessity, if nothing else – there has been a shift toward hiring individuals who are either native or who are well ingrained in some cultures and countries in order to be able to address the issues that this Agency must. It just takes a little time to build the cadre. If it were only one or two or three places that the Agency had to worry about…but no, it’s worldwide. It enriches the employee base with knowledge and information and helps to round out its employees. By and large, I would say be open minded. All of us come with preconceived ideas about a lot of things.
Title: Chief of CINTELCO (the CIA’s telephone company)
Time with the Agency: 19 years
Heritage: Puerto Rican
Q: How has your Hispanic heritage been helpful in your job at the Agency?
A: I bring a different view. I grew up with three sisters, so being the oldest I feel like I’m a good negotiator – being the oldest in the family and trying to keep the peace. I like to find a win-win situation, whether I’m working with my customers or my colleagues to deliver something. I feel that has been something unique that I’ve brought to the table. I think I have a good sense of humor. I try to lighten up things when it tends to get tense. If the team is having a really stressful time, I’ll try to bring that to the table. I think I get that from my Hispanic heritage, trying to socialize a little more so it’s not all work and no play.
Q: Why do you think commemorative months like Hispanic Heritage Month are important?
A: I think this is an opportunity as the Agency is really looking at valuing diversity that we take the time to celebrate those differences. I think it’s an opportunity for folks who want to learn more about those cultures that maybe didn’t grow up in a diverse environment. I was very lucky. I grew up in New York City, so it was very dynamic and diverse, whether I was in school or my neighborhood. Coming from New York here to the Washington area was a very rude awakening in the lack of diversity. So I think it provides an opportunity to — in a very non-confrontational way — talk about those differences, and have folks that don’t feel comfortable ask questions and try to understand more about that culture.
In my career, people have approached me and said, “Hey, I want to have a discussion with someone that’s Hispanic and I don’t want them to get really sensitive about it.” They practice with me. I find that refreshing, that they’re at least trying to value that and go into a session with an employee and they’re willing to not let their difference be thing that impacts how you deliver the message. I’ve done it with other senior managers.
Q: How does your Hispanic heritage influence your work ethic?
A: I’m a type A. I work a lot of long hours. I think that’s just from hard work. I think that growing up with my mom being a single mom and having to raise four girls in New York City was a very tough job for her. To me, she’s always been a role model. She didn’t know English so she had to put us in public school to learn English on our own. And even though she couldn’t help us with the homework, she would sit there and make sure that everything had an answer. To me, that brought in and instilled that you always did your best. I look back at my childhood and I say, she could do it and she didn’t even have any of the skill sets to do that, then I can bring something to the table to add value. I always think back on growing up and not having all those luxuries. I will always do the best in whatever I try to do.
Q: What motivates you to come to work every day? Why do you enjoy working at the Agency?
A: I think in the Agency, it’s just the different things that we can do as a mission. The one thing that — thinking back and reflecting on my career — I’ve most enjoyed is the diversity of assignments that I’ve been able to have. I think that if I had opted to go into a regular computer company, I probably wouldn’t have had the diversity of assignments. I tease my workforce here and say, “Who would have ever thought that a computer software engineer would be running the Agency telephone company?” I have no strong background in the telephone, but I’ve been able to learn in the past four years.
I have enjoyed the uniqueness of assignments – I’ve been a software developer, I’ve been a project manager, I ran the network side. The opportunity brings interesting flavor of coming in here and where you start your career, you don’t have to end it in there.
Q: How does the diverse workforce at the Agency influence your work and the work of others?
A: I think, especially if I look at my CINTELCO team here, I have managers here with a diverse background, whether it’s ethnic background or experience. When we’re sitting around the table trying to solve an issue, the ability for everybody to see the same problem in different views and bring those opinions to the table and not feel that just because I’m the chief my answer’s always right. It’s really kind of neat that everybody feels that they can bring that to the table. We’ve had several scenarios where we as the management didn’t think we could do something in a technological way and someone who’s fresh to the Agency will say, “Well, how about this way? I did it this way when I was working in the private sector.” That’s what diversity is – bringing that fresh perspective. Not trying to use the same hammer for every problem.
Visit our Careers section to learn more about diversity at CIA.
| Work Schedule: | Full Time | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Location: | Washington, DC metropolitan area |
The Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) is looking for graduate students to conduct lessons learned studies or to write histories of CIA operations, events, or issues. Candidates may work on small independent studies or on a segment of a larger study, but in either case they will be expected to produce a publishable contribution to the body of knowledge in the field of inquiry. Candidates will be given general instructions on the scope and objectives for the project, as well as direction and guidance for each stage of the project, but they will be responsible for the thoroughness and accuracy of their work.
Minimum requirements: Candidates should be working toward a graduate degree in history, political science, international relations, anthropology, sociology, or a related field. Excellent research, writing, and verbal skills are necessary. An ability to work independently within the framework set by the supervisor is required.
All applicants must successfully complete a thorough medical and psychological exam, a polygraph interview and an extensive background investigation. US citizenship is required.
To be considered suitable for Agency employment, applicants must generally not have used illegal drugs within the last twelve months. The issue of illegal drug use prior to twelve months ago is carefully evaluated during the medical and security processing.
Important Notice: Friends, family, individuals, or organizations may be interested to learn that you are an applicant for or an employee of the CIA. Their interest, however, may not be benign or in your best interest. You cannot control whom they would tell. We therefore ask you to exercise discretion and good judgment in disclosing your interest in a position with the Agency. You will receive further guidance on this topic as you proceed through your CIA employment processing.To Apply:
| Submit Resume Online
|
An equal opportunity employer and a drug-free work force.
We may have all come on different ships, but we're in the same boat now.
—Martin Luther King, Jr.
As Dr. King’s quote implies, even though the workforce at the Agency comes from a variety of diverse backgrounds, each and every employee is working toward the same mission — protecting America. The Agency would like to use Hispanic Heritage Month as an opportunity to highlight Hispanic employees who have gone above and beyond what is called for in order to contribute to the mission.
Hispanic Heritage Month (September 15-October 15) is one of many commemorative months that celebrates the diversity of America’s people. It is also a celebration of the independence of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico and Chile.
Here’s your opportunity to meet some CIA employees with a diverse background and learn about what drives them in their careers.
This is the second article in our series about Hispanic heritage at the CIA. To learn more, read the first article in our series.
Title: Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence
(Formerly Deputy Director of Intelligence)
Time with the Agency: 30 years
Heritage: Puerto Rican
Q: How has your Hispanic heritage been helpful in your job at the Agency?
A: I strongly believe in the importance of diversity of thought in the work of the CIA. And I do believe that everyone, based on their background and personal experiences, brings slightly different view points to problem solving and slightly different interpretations of data. My exposure, early on to, many different cultures—the fact that I was bilingual by the time that I was five—gives me a certain flexibility of mind that helps me be a better analyst and problem solver.
I think another area that I’ve used my heritage and language skills is in outreach for the CIA. I think it’s very important. When I go recruiting or make an outreach visit to schools in the Southwest, it gives me a lot of credibility to say that I graduated from a high school in Texas. For people out in that part of the world—and I know this was the case for me 35 years ago—it is really daunting to think of coming to the East Coast for school or work. I still think it is. In fact, I know it is because I talk to young men and women who tell me it is.
Q: Why do you think commemorative months like Hispanic Heritage Month are important?
A: I think we need to celebrate our differences and not try to hide them. I’m an optimist by nature, and I really think that we are to the point now socially that we understand it’s our differences that make us stronger. It’s important for us to recognize this because I think part of America’s strength is its multicultural nature. It’s important for all of us to recognize that as we build this multicultural country—because it is a work in progress—that we not force anybody to homogenize to some kind of lowest common denominator view of culture. Everybody has to respect the strengths of everybody else’s cultures. Hispanics have to respect the great Northern European cultural tradition of the United States – the English, the Irish, the German, the French. A lot of the original settlers, but of course the Spanish were among the original settlers of the Americas so they’re part of that mix. Everybody else has to respect each other.
I think it’s so exciting. It’s such a great strength for the U.S. We have such strong African-American culture, Asian-American culture, Jewish culture, indigenous culture, original settler cultures, and Hispanic culture. There’s a long tradition in America of not forgetting where we came from culturally. I hope that everyone in America will want to celebrate and join in becoming more knowledgeable about Hispanic culture.
Q: How does your Hispanic heritage influence your work ethic?
A: Everyone in my family was really hard working. My father was a sergeant in the Army. My brother is now a colonel in the Army. My mom went back and got her college degree when she was in her 40s. They were really hard working people. I was the first person in my family to go to college. For me, it was kind of an oddity for my family to accept that intellectual work was work, too. I thought about that a lot and have talked to other Hispanic groups around the country who say that it’s still like that in their families. There was this thing of having to overcome or get used to the fact that what I was doing was real work, even though it was intellectually based work.
Q: What motivates you to come to work every day? Why do you enjoy working at the Agency?
A: I enjoy people. What really made it click for me at the CIA was when—during the seventh or eighth year of my career—I had an opportunity to become a first-line manager. The combination of working with people and working with substance I found constantly exciting. I like new things. I have a lot of interest in new ideas. And if you’re interested in the world and how it’s emerging and evolving, there’s really no better place to work than at CIA. You really study the world on its own terms. You’re not implementing a policy; you’re trying to understand the world and I think that’s very important. It’s the people, the variety of substance, and the challenge of working on very difficult problems.
Q: How does the diverse workforce at the Agency influence your work and the work of others?
A: I say this line as kind of a joke when I talk to groups on diversity—it’s not literally true, but it’s metaphorically true. I say that when I started work here in 1978 at lunch time I would wander the halls looking because someone told me there was one other Puerto Rican working at the Agency and I wanted to find that person. That’s not a true story, but it represents a true feeling that when I started out, the organization was not very diverse in terms of ethnic background, gender, or lifestyle issues. It was just not a very diverse organization. The fact of the matter is that this country is becoming increasingly diverse and different parts of the world are becoming increasingly important to the future of the world. We have recognized that we have no choice, and that it is in fact to our advantage to become as diverse an organization as we can.
Title: National Clandestine Service, University Academic Chair for Leadership
Years with the Agency: 22
Heritage: Puerto Rican
Q: How has your Hispanic heritage been helpful in your job at the Agency?
A: Obviously, my ethnicity has offered me advantages during my overseas assignments in terms of language and cultural familiarity. More importantly, having a strong and unique ethnic background, I believe I have a greater understanding for other individuals who harbor unique social and cultural identity and customs. Relating and understanding others who have a strong ethnic sense of self, whether they be staff colleagues, liaison contacts, or just personal acquaintances, comes very easily to me.
Q: Why do you think commemorative months like Hispanic Heritage Month are important?
A: Given the increasing role of Americans of Hispanic origin in our society, it is only natural that we recognize the role and impact of Hispanic heritage in our country and our agency.
Q: How does your Hispanic heritage influence your work ethic?
A: Rather than my Hispanic heritage, I believe my work ethic has more to do with the particular values that my parents instilled in me growing up. They were tough and demanded a great deal from me. They granted me more freedoms only as I demonstrated the necessary maturity and responsibility. Maybe the Hispanic emphasis on family values comes into play here.
Q: What motivates you to come to work every day? Why do you enjoy working at the Agency?
A: I love what I do. I cannot overstate the value and importance of the CIA mission. Knowing that I am part of that mission is very important to me. Pride in the role of CIA has a great deal to do with my enjoyment of my profession. Regardless of whether or not I am recognized by the public, every day I know the contributions I have made to our country—that makes for job satisfaction.
Q: How does the diverse workforce at the Agency influence your work and the work of others?
A: Our country is a complex, but complimentary mosaic of peoples of all backgrounds. This factor comprises the basic foundation of what we do and who we are. If the Agency truly began as a predominantly white, male, Ivy League educated cabal of war veterans, that is certainly not us today. Those of us who have had the good fortune to join Agency ranks and brought our own distinct educational backgrounds, socioeconomic mixes, native languages, and both international and national characteristics can be proud to say that we have taken what our forbearers left us and made it better.
Title: Targeting Analyst
Time with the Agency: 10 years
Heritage: Puerto Rican
Q: How has your Hispanic heritage been helpful in your job at the Agency?
A: At [the Agency’s new employee] orientation I found out that there was a Hispanic Advisory Council (HAC). I didn’t even know that prior to accepting my job at the Agency. That was one of my networking groups. It gave me the opportunity to join the group and meet a lot of different officers from different directorates and explore my leadership capabilities. I ended up chairing the HAC. It gave me the opportunity to meet people at the Agency at higher levels. So, it provided me, in one way, an avenue to grow in my career. It also helped me feel like I belong. These organizations help minorities find people like themselves and become more acquainted with the Agency. From the perspective of my heritage, I see the differences and it makes me aware of how cultural differences can really enhance the ability of a team to work together.
Q: Why do you think commemorative months like Hispanic Heritage Month are important?
A: The key word is awareness. It doesn’t matter how often you talk about cultural difference and intolerance, there’s still room for improvement in that area. It makes you value your heritage more. It makes you feel proud.
Q: How does your Hispanic heritage influence your work ethic?
A: If anything, it makes me very proud because I’m a minority. It makes me want to excel here and be more of an example that Latinas can succeed and contribute. I feel more pressure to be good at what I’m doing and to prove that I can do it.
Q: What motivates you to come to work every day? Why do you enjoy working at the Agency?
A: The mission and the people. It’s always been about the mission. There hasn’t been a day in the 10 years that I’ve been at the Agency that I haven’t enjoyed working here. The mission has always been incredibly exciting. The impact of the mission is very clear.
Q: How does the diverse workforce at the Agency influence your work and the work of others?
A: It’s been proven time and again that it is key to the success of the organization and teamwork that you have diversity. I am a total believer in that. Almost every office that I’ve worked at in the past five or six years has been extremely diverse and it is recognized how that enhances the performance of a team. I’m not just talking about diversity of ethnicity here, I mean everything.
Visit our Careers section to learn more about diversity at CIA.
Picture this:
A group of disheveled soldiers huddles around a radio with the volume turned down low. The smooth, sultry voice of Marlene Dietrich sings about a soldier leaving behind his loved one to the melody of a slow, somber march. The song is “Lili Marlene”— a very popular tune among soldiers during World War II.
Such songs could easily dampen the morale of the most steadfast soldier, which is exactly what they were meant to do.
Marlene Dietrich is best known as the first German actress to flourish in Hollywood; however, she made a significant contribution to the war effort using her talents. During World War II, Dietrich recorded a number of anti-Nazi albums in German for the Office of Strategic Services (the forerunner of today’s CIA). The albums were a part of an effort by the OSS’ Morale Operations Branch to create propaganda that would lower the morale of German soldiers.
She was born Marie Magdalene Dietrich on Dec. 27, 1901 in Schöneberg, a district of Berlin, Germany. At age 11, she joined her two first names to form her new name, Marlene. She attended Auguste Victoria School for Girls and studied violin between 1906 and 1918. Her dreams of becoming a concert violinist were ruined when she injured her wrist.
In the early 1920s, Dietrich became a chorus girl and played small roles in Max Reinhardt’s theater. In 1922, she made her first film debut in So sind die Männer. Marlene met her husband, Rudolf Sieber, on the set of another movie that same year. The two married in May 1924.
Dietrich began to attract more and more attention as she continued to work in film and on the stage. In 1929 she landed her breakthrough role of Lola-Lola in The Blue Angel, directed by Josef von Sternberg. With encouragement from von Sternberg, Dietrich moved to the United States on contract with Paramount Pictures. Dietrich starred in six successful films between 1930 and 1935, one of which earned her an Oscar nomination.
After moving to the United States, Dietrich claims that she was approached by Nazi Party representatives to return to Germany. She turned them down.
In 1939, Dietrich became an American citizen.
With the beginning of U.S. involvement in the war in 1941, Dietrich became one of the first celebrities to raise war bonds. She entertained the troops on the front lines by singing and playing the musical saw. In response to being asked why she chose to do this, Dietrich replied, “It was the decent thing to do.”
The OSS’ Morale Operations (MO) Branch began producing “black” radio programs in 1943 that reached listeners all over Europe and the Mediterranean. The broadcasts were meant to create friction between the Italians, Fascists, and Nazis. The stations were jammed by the Axis on several occasions.
In 1944, “black” radio in northwest Europe had soared to new heights of sophistication. The most popular station was Soldatensender (Soldiers’ Radio). In order to hold the attention of the enemy audience, the MO decided that it needed to expand to produce higher quality programming.
The MO began to recruit Hollywood writers and talent for the MUZAK project. A special MO music department was established to write “black” lyrics for German and American songs. Famous performers, such as Marlene Dietrich, Bing Crosby and Dinah Shore were asked to record these songs especially for Soldatensender. Dietrich’s “Lili Marlene” was particularly popular.
The Nazi government issued warnings not to listen to Soldatensender and banned the broadcast of “Lili Marlene.” After receiving many letters from Axis soldiers to put the song back on the air, the government reluctantly gave in. “Lili Marlene” soon became the song played at the end of every broadcast.
The MO found that the “black” radio programs were particularly effective with the enemy civilian and military populations. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey discovered that the programs were just as devastating to German morale as an air raid. The “black” programs succeeded in raising the level of skepticism so high, that many people no longer believed Nazi propaganda.
In 1945 the U.S. government awarded Dietrich with the Presidential Medal of Freedom, which is one of the highest civilian awards in the United States. Dietrich said that this was the accomplishment she was most proud of in her life. She died at age 90 on May 6, 1992 in Paris.
| Work Schedule: | Full Time |
|---|---|
| Location: | Washington, DC metropolitan area |
Applications for the Undergraduate Scholarship Program are accepted from July 15 - November 1.
If you are a high school senior planning to enroll in a 4-or 5-year college program, or you are a college sophomore enrolled in a 4-or 5-year college program, who is looking for career experience in a dynamic environment, apply to the CIA's Undergraduate Scholar Program and contribute to the work of the nation before you graduate.
The opportunity to make a difference
The Undergraduate Scholar Program was developed, in part, to assist minority and disabled students, but application is open to all students who meet the requirements. The program offers unmatched experience. You'll complete work sessions during each summer break, increasing your knowledge and job responsibilities while assisting intelligence professionals and applying your academic skills.
We believe in challenging our Scholars with meaningful work that relates to their college major. An IT major, for example, might be given increasingly complex projects involving sophisticated computer systems. An engineering major might help produce a piece of state-of-the-art equipment. A finance major could be involved in developing and analyzing budgets for a worldwide operation. A foreign language major might be instrumental in translating documents for US policymakers. As a final example, a human resource major could have the opportunity to develop and implement personnel policies and procedures.
Once selected, you will be given an annual salary; a benefits package that includes health insurance, life insurance, and retirement; and up to $18,000 per calendar year for tuition, mandatory fees, books and supplies. You'll be required to work at an Agency facility during summer breaks and to maintain full-time college status during the school year with a minimum cumulative 3.0/4.0 GPA.We will pay the cost of transportation between school and the Washington, DC area each summer and provide a housing allowance.
Because the Scholar Program is an investment in you, accepting an offer means making a career choice. We ask that you agree to continue employment with the Agency after college graduation for a period equal to 1.5 times the length of your college sponsorship.
The Scholar Program is extremely competitive. We ask that all applicants meet the following requirements:
If you are eligible for this Program, apply online between July 15 - November 1. Qualified applicants will be contacted and asked to provide the following information to supplement their online application:
All applicants must successfully complete a thorough medical and psychological exam, a polygraph interview and an extensive background investigation.
To be considered suitable for Agency employment, applicants must generally not have used illegal drugs within the last twelve months. The issue of illegal drug use prior to twelve months ago is carefully evaluated during the medical and security processing.
Important Notice: Friends, family, individuals, or organizations may be interested to learn that you are an applicant for or an employee of the CIA. Their interest, however, may not be benign or in your best interest. You cannot control whom they would tell. We therefore ask you to exercise discretion and good judgment in disclosing your interest in a position with the Agency. You will receive further guidance on this topic as you proceed through your CIA employment processing.
Resumes submitted before July 15 and after November 1 will not be reviewed.
To Apply:
| Submit Resume Online
|
An equal opportunity employer and a drug-free work force.
“CAP is one in the great success stories of the history of the DI."
-- Michael Morell
Director for
Intelligence
The Career Analyst Program (CAP) at CIA has been hailed as one of the greatest success stories in the history of the Agency and the Directorate of Intelligence (DI). It was created by senior DI leaders in May 2000 to provide new analysts the tools and tradecraft needed to be successful intelligence analysts.
Last week, the CIA celebrated this success with the graduation of CAP’s 100th class. Director for Intelligence Michael Morell was thrilled to open the graduation ceremony and welcome friends and family of the CAP 100 graduates. For this special occasion, colleagues filled the CIA headquarters auditorium, cheering on the graduates with an enthusiasm that would rival a college graduation. “CAP is one in the great success stories of the history of the DI,” said Morell before introducing the keynote speaker, Deputy Director Stephen Kappes.
DI leaders created CAP eight years ago with one simple goal: to put new analysts on a path to success in the specialized and increasingly demanding profession of intelligence analysis. The course focuses on tradecraft, but also teaches analysts about the challenges of the intelligence profession: how it works, lessons learned from both our successes and failures, and how the DI must continuously improve to meet our mission.
At the graduation ceremony, Deputy Director Stephen Kappes called the DI and the Career Analyst Program a national treasure.
“The United States has only one center for intelligence analysis that is global in scope and free of departmental influence. CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence has set benchmarks for analytic rigor, substantive depth, and objective integrity that are unsurpassed in the world.”
Present and past CAP graduates have seen the value of the program in the quality of their analysis.
“CAP provides analysts with a foundation of skills to be successful,” said Kate, a graduate of CAP 100. “It also allows us to network with people outside of our office and become more familiar with the Agency.”
Emilia, a graduate of the first CAP class in 2000, agrees that it is a valuable program.
“CAP quickly brought me up to speed on what exactly an analyst did and how we fit into the bigger Agency and Intelligence Community picture,” she said. “I returned to my team much more confident than when I left, and I believe that new confidence helped me make a better contribution.”
The program currently involves 16 weeks of intensive learning of foundational analytic tradecraft and about the history, mission, and values of the Agency and the DI. CAP also places special emphasis on creating a foundation of analytic tradecraft skills for new analysts.
CAP is organized into a series of modules that fall into one of six categories that weave throughout the program:
CAP emphasizes learning by doing. Each module is reinforced by class participation in practical exercises. Task force exercises are used to challenge new analysts to perform demanding analytic tasks under tight deadlines, giving them practice in crisis management.
Each analyst also spends five weeks at an interim assignment to use his or her skills elsewhere in the Intelligence Community, the policy community, or the Agency.
The Career Analyst Program is dynamic; its curriculum continues to evolve in response to analyst and manager feedback and close collaboration with the Directorate, ensuring CAP embodies and helps lead changing DI priorities. Our goal is to instill the knowledge and skills necessary not only for how the DI operates today, but how it should operate now and in the future. The next changes to the curriculum will bring even more realism into the training environment, enabling analysts to “train like we fight.”
Visit the Intelligence & Analysis page for more information about the DI.
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Statement to Employees by Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Mike Hayden on Promoting an Effective Transition
November 5, 2008
Presidential elections are a centerpiece of our democracy. Now that the American people have had their say, their federal government assumes an additional responsibility. Beyond all the tasks in place on November 4th, the public expects us to do what we can to ensure a smooth, effective transition to a new administration. Our Agency would have it no other way.
For CIA, on duty since 1947, this is familiar ground. As intelligence officers, we know that the insights we provide are national assets, a decisive advantage for any President. We understand that our mission of protecting America and advancing its ideals and interests abroad is constant. And we recognize that the challenges facing our country, and the enemies who would do it harm, are not about to disappear for the next few months.
That means that we in the Intelligence Community will have—until noon on January 20th—two sets of consumers. As we continue to serve the current administration, we are also in touch with President-elect Obama and his national security team. Through expanded access, greater than what he had in his briefings as a candidate or as a Senator, he will see the full range of capabilities we deploy for the United States.
As you would expect, CIA will play a central part in the Intelligence Community’s outreach to the President-elect. The Agency leadership will meet this morning to discuss the transition. We have already prepared a great deal of information about CIA for the Obama team. The goal today is to review what has been done and to ensure that every part of the Agency is well-placed to contribute in the weeks ahead. DNI McConnell, who will launch the first briefing of the incoming administration, has asked Michael Morell, our Director for Intelligence, to be his representative throughout that process. The two principal briefers for the President-elect are also CIA careerists. That is but one reflection of the deep expertise that resides here.
With every transition comes speculation about personnel changes across government. At this point, I would urge you to ignore it. I certainly have. Those privileged to lead this organization understand that they serve at the pleasure of the President. I am proud to represent you and your work to the President and the country at large. CIA has had, in the past few years, many successes against some of the toughest targets imaginable. The job of senior leadership at CIA is, more than anything, to create conditions that allow you to excel. What counts most is your further success. It is what our nation needs and deserves.
Your dedication, skill, creativity, and courage are true sources of inspiration. I have no doubt that your hard work—defined by integrity—will earn the trust and confidence of America’s new leaders, just as it has before.
Mike Hayden
The Central Intelligence Agency is unlike any other Agency in the U.S. Government. Here you can find exhibits, museum galleries, statues, and a memorial wall and garden dedicated to our remarkable colleagues—men and women from every directorate—who have given their lives while advancing our Agency’s mission. While CIA Headquarters is accessible only to our Agency’s family, this publication will provide you with a small window into our hallways in both the Original and New Headquarters Buildings and the surrounding campus.
We welcome you to learn about our history and mission.
To learn more about our sites to see, visit our online headquarters virtual tour.
During World War II, the capability of the Allied forces to decrypt a large number of messages sent via the Enigma machine was a significant breakthrough for intelligence organizations around the world. It is believed that this breakthrough shortened the war by as many as two years and saved many lives.
Another breakthrough in codes occurred at this time, but from a different perspective. Twenty-nine Navajo Marines developed a code from their native language that would stump cryptanalysts around the world. The code that the Navajo Code Talkers developed protected precious intelligence that could have lost the war for the Allied forces had it been broken.
CIA employee Glenn Nez had no idea that his father, Jack Nez, was one of the first 29 Code Talkers that helped develop the code.
Jack Nez never shared much about his experiences during World War II with his family.
“He showed us some pictures from a scrapbook that all soldiers take from wherever they’re stationed. We saw pictures of where he was on Wake Island, but he never told us what he did,” Glenn said.
The Navajo Code Talker program wasn’t declassified until 1968. Although Jack Nez passed away nine years later, he never shared his tales of being a code talker with his family. Glenn thinks the secrecy of the program kept his father from telling his family what role he played during the war.
“I got the impression not just from him, but from other Code Talkers, that they were very secretive about what they did,” Glenn said. “All we knew was that he was a radio operator, and technically, they were because they talked over the radio.”
Glenn Nez and his family didn’t find out about their father’s participation in the program until 2000, when Congress passed and President Bill Clinton signed a bill to recognize the Code Talkers. The story was in newspapers nationwide. The family learned of Jack’s role when they recognized a picture of him in an article.
“We were in shock when we found out, but in a good way,” Glenn said. “We were very proud to know that he was involved with this bit of history.”
Jack Nez was born in 1924 and grew up in Fort Defiance, Arizona, on a Navajo reservation. He was fluent in the Navajo language. Jack left the reservation to attend high school. He spent his college years studying to become an auto mechanic at Haskell University in Lawrence, Kansas. It was there that he met Glenn’s mother, LaVera, who was studying to become a nurse.
With the start of U.S. involvement in World War II, Jack decided to volunteer for the Marine Corps. He was 17. It was soon discovered that Jack could speak Navajo and he offered to participate in a special project involving the Navajo language. The group of Navajos was separated from the rest of the Marines and asked to develop a code. Jack served in the Pacific Islands from January 1943 to August 1944.
The life of a code talker was exciting and, at times, dangerous. The Code Talkers worked in pairs—one on the frontlines and one behind the lines—and communicated over the radio and telephone. There were no code manuals. The Code Talkers had to memorize everything in order to minimize the risk of the enemy breaking the code.
On July 26, 2001, President George W. Bush presented the Nez family, as well as other Code Talkers and their families, with the Congressional Gold Medal. This award, as well as some of Jack’s other medals, are on display at CIA Headquarters.
“With an award of such honor, you can’t just put it in a safety deposit box and keep it at home,” Glenn said. “It’s something that you have to share with everybody. If it weren’t for those men, I don’t think this world would be the way it is.”
Glenn and most of his siblings have gone on to serve in the military or the government. In fact, Glenn’s job has an eerie similarity to his father’s duty as a code talker during World War II. He serves as a support administrator to the language school.
“My father would be very proud of how we’ve carried on in his name and example,” Glenn said. “We’re all very proud of our country.”’
Related Story:
Statement to Employees by Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Mike Hayden on Gratitude for Our Veterans
November 7, 2008
Earlier this week, our democracy was on full display at polling places across America. At CIA, we are ever mindful that the rights we enjoy in that democracy are preserved and passed on by each generation. And we are ever grateful for the service of those who risked and sacrificed all to protect our way of life.
On this Veterans Day, we honor not only America’s men and women in uniform, past and present, but also the thousands of Agency officers who have served beside them in conflicts since the Korean War. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places of great danger and consequence, our colleagues today advance a strong tradition of skill and daring. Their work, along with that of all who support them at Headquarters and around the world, makes a decisive difference to our military partners and our nation’s leaders.
America’s safety is hard-won each and every day. No matter where you serve or what you do to accomplish CIA’s mission, the leadership team is grateful for your essential contributions.
Mike Hayden
This is a part of our series about CIA employees who have made the ultimate sacrifice. Here we will look at the lives of the men and women who have died while serving their country.
Currently, there are 89 stars carved into the marble of the CIA Memorial Wall. The wall stands as a silent, simple memorial to those employees “who gave their lives in the service of their country.” The CIA has released the names of 54 employees; the names of the remaining 35 officers must remain secret, even in death.
Early in his career as an analyst, John Celli’s superiors tagged him as a leader with exceptional interpersonal skills. During his four years at the Central Intelligence Agency, he did not disappoint. In November 1996, John died in a traffic accident while overseas on a temporary duty assignment.
John was born in the Bronx district of New York City. He grew up in New Milford, Connecticut. At New Milford High School, John was known as a strong leader and was elected National Honor Society president. In 1987, he graduated with honors.
In the fall of 1987, John began his college career at Georgetown University. He majored in international economics with a concentration in finance and commerce. At Georgetown’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, John was considered a class leader. In 1989, he spent a semester overseas at the University of Spain. In addition to his studies, John also was involved in many service organizations. He graduated magna cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa with a bachelor’s degree in 1991. John was the first person in his family to earn a college degree.
John joined the CIA in January 1992 and was selected for the Agency’s Career Training Program. The program was entry-level training for both Directorate of Operations (now the National Clandestine Service) and Directorate of Intelligence (DI) officers. John completed the program in 1993 and was assigned to the DI where he worked in the Office of Resources, Trade and Technology (which later became the Office of Transnational Security and Technology Issues) as an economic analyst. He quickly earned a reputation for being an intelligent, hardworking and friendly analyst. John was always more than willing to volunteer for temporary duty stints or extra duties.
While John liked to work hard, he also liked to play hard. He was an avid outdoorsman. Hiking, skiing and basketball were among a few of his favorite outdoor activities.
One of John’s colleagues recalled seeing a picture of John jumping center against NBA player Dikembe Mutembo when he played intramural basketball at Georgetown.
“John wasn’t a tall guy,” his colleague said. “His team knew that it didn’t matter who they put against Mutembo. That was the kind of tongue-in-cheek humor John had.”
John also had a love for martial arts. He earned a third-degree black belt and instructor’s certificate in Tang Soo Do. At the time of his death, John was head instructor and proprietor of two Tang Soo Do studios—one in Virginia and one in Maryland. He frequently made trips to Philadelphia to study with Chuck Norris’ trainer. John was also a stamp and coin collector.
During John’s brief time with the Agency, he made a lasting impression on his colleagues. After speaking with many of John’s friends and colleagues about the 12th anniversary of his death, it is clear that he is still missed and thought of fondly.
“He had an uncontainable enthusiasm about him,” said a colleague and lifelong friend. “He would wake up in the morning with a smile on his face and go to bed with smile on his face.”
At the Agency’s 1997 annual memorial ceremony, then Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet spoke about how John lived his life in abundance:
“And the greatest thing he did was to give all he had, not just to his job, but to all those around him. He genuinely cared for people, loved working with people, and helped others at every opportunity. He lived a life in full abundance; and we could learn from how he lived a great lesson on how we ourselves should live. That lesson is love: love of truth and goodness, love for country, love for this Agency’s family.”
In March 1997, John was posthumously awarded the Exceptional Service Medallion and the Intelligence Commendation Medal for his distinguished service to the Agency.
John’s memory is honored with a star on the Agency’s Memorial Wall. His name also appears in the CIA Book of Honor. John is survived by his parents, brother and sister.
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Transcript of Remarks by Central Intelligence Agency Director
Michael Hayden at the Atlantic Council
November 13, 2008
It's a real pleasure to be back here at the Atlantic Council. It's an organization that does so much to promote the right kind of leadership in international affairs. Last year, I had a wonderful conversation with the council's International Advisory Board. And when General Scowcroft invited me to come here today, I readily accepted it.
I'm going to be one of the first speakers -- Arnold and the general pointed out -- in a series devoted to intelligence issues. And I want to focus on the issue within my community that demands more energy and attention than any other. That's the threat of terrorism.
And before I do that, though, I need to point out that General Scowcroft made his first contact with CIA about today's speech in January of 2008. We firmed up the date in June of 2008. And here I am, giving an assessment of al-Qa’ida eight days after a national election and 10 weeks before a new president takes office.
When any of you think of CIA as a risk-averse agency, you need to think of today.
For more than seven years now, the United States, with our allies in Europe and around the world, we've waged an unprecedented fight against al-Qa’ida, its affiliates, and its sympathizers.
My agency, CIA, has been at the forefront of that fight, using all of our authorities and all of our capabilities. That's human and technical collection, all-source analysis, and covert action to protect the homeland from another devastating attack.
Now as our nation prepares for its first wartime presidential transition in 40 years, it's the responsibility of CIA -- frankly, it's the responsibility of the entire intelligence community -- to give the incoming administration as clear a picture as possible of the state of this conflict and of the shape of the enemy.
Now, I know I'm biased, but, frankly, I believe that CIA's understanding of al-Qa’ida is second to none. And so my remarks today will draw on the insights of officers who have tracked, studied and countered this threat for years.
Much of what we know about al-Qa’ida comes from this creative and aggressive set of clandestine operations that CIA conducts around the world, including in places of great danger.
Now, there will clearly be limits to what I can say in this kind of forum. But my goal here today is to give you as good an idea as I can of how my agency views this threat seven years after the attacks of September 11th.
Last May, I gave a reporter a bottom-line assessment of America's performance in the global war on terror. It wasn't all that technical. The actual quote was, "On balance, not bad. I think we're doing pretty well." That is, by the way, a view that I still hold.
Now, at the time when that comment was made public, it got a fair amount of attention, stirred some controversy, and, frankly, as can happen with some front-page stories, the headline seemed to overshadow both the content and the context of the longer article.
And so, as I discuss the state of al-Qa’ida today in 2008, I want to make sure that you take away both the headline and the underlying complexity.
Now, let me make three points. Number one, al-Qa’ida has suffered serious setbacks, but it remains a determined, adaptive enemy, unlike any our nation has ever faced.
This war -- and let me underscore that -- you should make no mistake that this is anything else but a war. This war is far from over.
Now, to be very clear, all of the elements of national power are going to be required in order to keep the republic and the homeland safe. That's the tools of law enforcement, diplomacy, and a variety of other methodologies that we have at our disposal. But at its core, I personally and my agency believe that we are in a state of war with al-Qa’ida.
Second, al-Qa’ida today is both resilient and vulnerable. Our job as intelligence professionals is to understand that complex picture so we can provide warning and opportunity to those who are making decisions on behalf of our country.
And, third, al-Qa’ida operating from its safe haven in Pakistan's tribal areas remains the most clear and present danger to the safety of the United States. If there is a major strike against this country, it will bear the fingerprints of al-Qa’ida.
To quickly review, al-Qa’ida has suffered serious setbacks, but it's a determined, adaptive enemy. Secondly, today, al-Qa’ida is resilient and vulnerable. And, third, it remains the most serious threat to the nation.
Now, from those three points flows an enduring responsibility, a responsibility that's deeply felt by every CIA officer, and that's to protect the homeland from attack.
Out at Langley, there's an office. It's one of the most operational offices we have in our campus, and it's absolutely crucial in the day-to-day fight against terrorism. And there's a sign in that office -- and I've said in other public fora, but it bears repeating. There's a sign in that office that captures the sense of duty and determination that exists inside my agency today.
It's simply this: It says, "Today's date is September 12, 2001." And when you walk in to that office, there's a divider there, a wall. You've got to go left or right. It is what you see. At first glance, it appears to be one of those signs of convenience, almost as if it was telling you the Julian date or the time of day. And only when you pay attention do you recognize that at all times it says, "Today's date is September 12th."
It has for me, every time I see it -- and I'm in that office a lot -- it has an emotional impact. More than a year ago, right around the anniversaries of the attack, about 14 months ago, I gave a speech in New York at the Council on Foreign Relations. I said to that audience at that time that, when I'm in that office, I get the sense that today really is September 12, 2001. And when I get in my car and go home and drive down Route 123 or the G.W. Parkway, the further I get away from the agency, the more of a sense I get that today's date is September 10th.
And I don't mean September 10th in the sense that an attack is imminent. I mean September 10th in the sense of a complacency inside the larger American population. And I don't mean to be critical about that. It's the seventh year since an attack. It has probably both normal and healthy that the largest part of our population is going about their business with a feeling of safety.
But the American people are right to expect that CIA does not feel that way and remains focused on that date, September 12th. They expect us to do all we can do to stop those with a clear intent to attack us. They're right to expect that we will do all we can to disrupt this most urgent and deadly threat. We have and we are doing that, and we're doing it, and we have done it with lawful tools, lawfully applied. And I'll talk a little bit about that today, as well.
Now, as you know, al-Qa’ida is an organization with ambitions that stretch across many regions. Any appraisal of its current state then requires a look at several points around the globe. So let me start with Iraq.
Three years ago, in a letter to the leader of al-Qa’ida in Iraq, Osama bin Ladin's deputy declared that that country, Iraq, was the central front in the global jihad. Foreign fighters, money, weapons streamed into Iraq fueling a fierce insurgency that aimed to advance al-Qa’ida's goal of an Islamic caliphate from Morocco to Indonesia. Indeed, bin Ladin had previously stated that Baghdad would be the capital of the caliphate.
Even today, al-Qa’ida in Iraq remains that organization's -- al-Qa’ida's -- largest regional affiliate. It still can and does inflict damage. No matter what residual tactical strength it retains in Iraq, though, the most important point is that al-Qa’ida in Iraq is on the verge of strategic defeat.
The U.S. military fought and the Iraqi people rejected the AQI- led insurgency. al-Qa’ida lost its power when Iraqis came to see it for what it was: a terrorist organization waging war on the Iraqi people.
Today, that flow of money, weapons, and foreign fighters I talked about? That flow is greatly diminished. And we don't often hear al-Qa’ida’s senior leadership pointing to Iraq as the central front in their global battle. In fact, bleed out from Iraq, the export or frequently what we see, the diversion of terrorists and their deadly capabilities, is as much a concern now as the ongoing threat of AQI attacks inside the country of Iraq itself.
Many of the foreign fighters who have left Iraq over the past three years have, frankly, been frustrated by their lack of success or disillusioned with al-Qa’ida's ideas and tactics. Some have likely abandoned the fight altogether, and they've simply gone home to resume their lives. Others leave Iraq with hopes of building al-Qa’ida capacity elsewhere. And that might be Afghanistan or Lebanon, on the Arabian Peninsula, North Africa, just to name a few examples. We even see some Iraq veterans involved in planning attacks in the West, in Europe and in the United States.
Now, this bleed-out problem is one we have always known we would have to deal with, but I frankly take a great deal of personal consolation in knowing that that shift, that shift we're seeing is further evidence that al-Qa’ida in Iraq has failed.
In Saudi Arabia, a place where bin Ladin lived for many years and home of Islam's holiest sites, al-Qa’ida's operational arm is also largely defeated. Aggressive efforts by the Saudi security forces between 2003 and 2006 led to the death or capture of most al-Qa’ida leaders and operatives within the kingdom. Financing networks were disrupted. The Saudi interior ministry undertook what is perhaps the world's most effective counter- radicalization program.
One of the real delights in my job is I get to meet the liaison partners of CIA. And I have to tell you, among the most fascinating dialogues I have is sitting and talking with our Islamic partners, including the kingdom, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. I learn such a great deal in those dialogues.
And I'm struck, maybe even surprised, although, looking backward on it, I shouldn't have been surprised, but I'm certainly struck by the degree of emotion in my Islamic counterpart's voice when he is talking about al-Qa’ida and how un-Islamic al-Qa’ida really is.
The kingdom remains an al-Qa’ida target, but today much of that threat comes from outside its borders, which is a vastly different scenario than we saw only a few years ago.
The situation in Southeast Asia has also changed dramatically. I'm sure you recall the series of deadly attacks on Western interests in the years just after 9/11, the Bali bombing in 2000, followed in fairly quick succession by attacks on the Marriott Hotel and the Australian embassy in Jakarta, and then simultaneous suicide attacks again in Bali in 2005.
Hundreds were killed in those plots, all executed by Jemaah Islamiyah, an organization that was al-Qa’ida's Southeast Asian affiliate. While J.I. still exists today, its once-robust relationship with al-Qa’ida is gone. Its plots are increasingly detected and disrupted. Hundreds of its leaders and operatives have been captured or killed by the Indonesian national police.
The group's capabilities and its confidence are simply not what they were three years ago thanks to aggressive action by one of our most effective counterterrorism partners. This past week, I'm sure many of you have read that three of the perpetrators of the Bali bombing were actually executed, a very dramatic step that underscores the determination of the Jakarta government in this global war.
The terrorist ambitions of J.I.'s Philippine-based ally, the Abu Sayyaf group, have been similarly degraded by persistent pressure from our Filipino allies.
I also want to highlight one other area of significant progress, and it's not geographically focused. It's an area of progress that I'd simply call the ideological front. In the military we're very accustomed to thinking in terms of the close battle and the deep battle. This fight, this ideological fight, is the deep fight. That's the battle for hearts and minds, and it has a very deep time horizon.
But over the past year or so, there is clear and mounting evidence that we have real cause for optimism. Some hard-line religious leaders are speaking out against al-Qa’ida's tactics and its ideology. And polling has shown that support for al-Qa’ida and bin Ladin is falling in many predominantly Muslim countries.
In fact, more and more Muslims are pushing back against the senseless violence and flawed worldview of al-Qa’ida. Credible, influential voices are refuting al-Qa’ida's twisted justification for murdering innocents. These voices are tapping into doubts about al-Qa’ida that have always been there. People understand that most victims of terrorism are Muslim, and they ask a simple question: What justifies this?
The answer from al-Qa’ida is one that a vast majority of people in the Islamic world simply now don't espouse. They don't support bin Ladin's caliphate. They don't want to be governed as the Afghan people were governed by the Taliban.
Even today, as we speak, in New York City, one of the most prominent voices in Islam, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, the keeper of the two holy places, is right now sponsoring and attending an international symposium on religious tolerance. I've always said that the civilized world will win this fight when we win the war of ideas. And so these developments are very, very promising.
And I should underscore, this conflict of ideas requires authentic voices. And in the world as we find it, in this conflict as we find it, authentic voices are Islamic voices. And what I've just referred to are Islamic voices speaking out against al-Qa’ida.
This is very promising, but, remember, point number one earlier was that al-Qa’ida is determined and adaptive. In the face of setbacks, their senior leadership recalibrates. They constantly look for ways to make up for losses, extend their reach, take advantage of opportunities, and we're seeing that.
We see it clearly today in places like North Africa, or Somalia, or Yemen. The presence of extremist sympathizers, the raw availability of weapons and ungoverned space, the lack of effective security make these areas attractive locations for al-Qa’ida recruitment and training, as well as attacks. In addition, one of those, North Africa, provides an easy transit point for those destined to facilitate or carry out attacks in Europe.
The level of focus and activity we're seeing in these areas is troubling. In fact, the recent attacks and threats from al-Qa’ida in the land of the Islamic Maghreb are greater in scope and severity than any since the group merged with al-Qa’ida about two years ago.
Suicide attacks against an Algerian military barracks and nearby cafe in June, along with several recent attacks on French tourists and workers, they underscore not only the group's intent to strike Western targets, but its ability, its ability to plot and operate even under the tightened security regime that we now see in Algeria.
In East Africa, al-Qa’ida's engaging Somali extremists to revitalize operations. And while there clearly has not yet been an official merger, the leader of the al-Shabaab terrorist group is closely tied to al-Qa’ida. And the recent bombings in Somalia may have meant, at least in part, may have been meant to strengthen the bona fides of this group with al-Qa’ida's senior leaders. A merger between al-Shabaab and al-Qa’ida could give Somali extremists much needed funding while al-Qa’ida could then claim to be re-establishing its operations based in East Africa. That's a base that was severely disrupted about two years ago when Ethiopia moved into Somalia.
Yemen is another country of concern, a place where al-Qa’ida is strengthening. We've seen an unprecedented number of attacks this year, 2008, including two on our embassy. Plots are increasing not only in number, but in sophistication, and the range of targets is broadening. Al-Qa’ida cells are operating from remote tribal areas where the government has traditionally had very little authority, and they're being led or reinforced by veterans of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
I mentioned earlier that the threat to Saudi Arabia was probably more external than internal. And these developments in Yemen are the primary reason for that reality.
North Africa, East Africa, Yemen serve as kind of a counterweight to the good news out of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, but make no mistake: What I've just mentioned, East Africa, North Africa, Yemen, these are not problems on the same scale as Iraq or Saudi Arabia. But al-Qa’ida's strength in these areas demonstrates not only its adaptability and determination, but that characteristic I've mentioned several times now: resilience.
Now, let me turn to that part of the globe that's most important to al-Qa’ida, most important to al-Qa’ida's continuing operations. Al-Qa’ida's sanctuary along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, in those tribal areas, has allowed it to recover some of the capacity lost when it was expelled from Afghanistan almost seven years ago now.
The group has reconstituted some training and operational capabilities. It's increased its recruitment and its propaganda efforts. It's established a more durable leadership structure. It's built redundancies into its plotting, and it's developed a bench of skilled operatives to carry plans forward when other plans are disrupted.
All of that activity is enabled by a fairly recent development, and that's al-Qa’ida's ties to local tribes. The terrorist group -- here I'm talking about al-Qa’ida -- has developed a close codependent relationship with Pashtun extremists and separatist groups. Al-Qa’ida, foreigners in a land that's long been suspicious of foreigners, has been able to curry favor with locals by supporting their causes, training their fighters, funding their operations, and, importantly, showing sufficient deference to tribal leaders.
Bin Ladin's lieutenants work in concert with Pakistani militant groups as long as the operational goals of those groups don't conflict with al-Qa’ida's own strategic objectives. And increasingly, ties to the tribes are being made a bit more permanent through intermarriage.
Now, the safe haven in the tribal region, in the FATA, that safe haven is not comparable to what al-Qa’ida had in Afghanistan. It's not comparable in terms of either security or scale, but it is more worrisome today than it was two or three years ago. Cross-border attacks in Afghanistan are more violent and aggressive, as are al-Qa’ida's efforts to destabilize Pakistan itself. Furthermore, we're seeing a disturbing emphasis on the recruitment, training, and deployment of Western operatives.
What do I mean by Western operatives? Those are people who may not elicit any notice whatsoever from you if they were standing next to you in the airport line.
The cross-over point for al-Qa’ida's foothold in the tribal areas was probably in September of 2006 when the governor of North-West Frontier Province signed a peace agreement with local militants in North Waziristan. That truce set in motion a whole series of events and decisions that gave al-Qa’ida a lot more breathing space than it had had previously.
Let me be very clear: Today, virtually every major terrorist threat that my agency is aware of has threads back to the tribal areas. Whether it's command and control, training, direction, money, capabilities, there is a connection to the FATA.
It is no overstatement to say that al-Qa’ida's base in Pakistan is the single most important factor today in the group's resilience and its ability to threaten the West. So it may surprise some of you to hear me say that it also represents a key vulnerability.
The truth is, it's not all that easy to build a worldwide terrorist network and manage a global fight from an isolated outpost in northwestern Pakistan. And to the extent that the United States and its allies deepen that isolation, disturb the safe haven, target terrorist leaders there, we keep al-Qa’ida off-balance.
The Pakistani government and military deserves great credit for its current campaign against extremists in Bajaur Agency. The Pakistani army has been fighting there forcefully and with considerable success since early August. This is a major commitment. This is a multi-brigade operation. It is a very hard fighting. They are suffering significant casualties, but they are also imposing significant casualties on our common enemy.
Throughout the FATA, al-Qa’ida and its allies are feeling less secure today than they did two, three or six months ago. It has become difficult for them to ignore significant losses in their ranks. Midlevel operatives have been killed.
And in the past year alone, a number of senior al-Qa’ida leaders who have sought refuge in the tribal areas have died, either by violence or natural causes. These include a chief of external operations, a senior commander who plotted attacks against the coalition in Afghanistan, a seasoned explosives expert and trainer, a veteran combat leader, and a senior operational planner.
Those losses are significant. These men were decision-makers, commanders, experienced and committed fighters at the center of planning attacks, not only in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but against Europe and the United States. When we and our allies take terrorists like this off the battlefield, there's a real psychological effect, as well. Those that remain are feeling some heat, and they're not happy about it.
By making a safe haven feel less safe, we keep al-Qa’ida guessing. We make them doubt their allies, question their methods, their plans, even their priorities. Most importantly, we force them to spend more time and resources on self- preservation. And that distracts them, at least partially and at least for a time, from laying the groundwork for the next attack.
What I have just described is the fundamental difference between the approach to fighting terrorism before 9/11 and our approach today. We and our allies weren't playing offense before; we were in perpetual defense.
I make this point to a variety of audiences. When I make it to an audience in North America -- or, actually, when I make it globally, the metaphor I usually use is football. And when I make it to a North American audience, it's American football. Prior to 9/11, it was as if al-Qa’ida was first and goal on the three. They ran off-tackle, got stuffed. The referee picked the ball up, put it back down on three, and said, "First and goal." If you're a European audience -- I see my good friends from the German embassy here -- and we talk about what the rest of the world calls football, it was perpetual penalty kicks, OK?
After September 11th attacks, we said, "No more." Of all the things that have been done to help protect the homeland, the single most important one in my view is that America and its friends have taken the fight to the enemy.
A comment like that, any discussion of American successes against al-Qa’ida, typically leads to another question: What about bin Ladin? Why haven't we killed or captured him?
Anyone familiar with the Afghan-Pakistan border area knows how rugged and inaccessible it is. You know, in preparation for this, I sat down and read and re-read my speech this morning and over lunch. And four times I came across language in the speech that in one way or another stressed the importance of isolation and ungoverned territory to the survival of al-Qa’ida.
Think about it. That may be the most damning thing we can say about this organization, that it can only subsist beyond the reach of civilization, beyond the reach of the rule of law. It survives only in the absence of law. And we see that in those other areas that I've mentioned, the more remote areas of Somalia or Yemen or along the Afghan-Pakistan border area.
Beyond that remoteness -- remember, I'm talking about the hunt for bin Ladin -- beyond that remoteness, the sheer challenge of surveying every square mile of that inhospitable and dangerous region, part of the explanation for his survival lies in the fact that he has worked to avoid detection. He is putting a lot of energy into his own survival, a lot of energy into his own security. In fact, he appears to be largely isolated from the day-to-day operations of the organization he nominally heads.
I can assure you, although there has been press speculation to the contrary, I can assure you that the hunt for bin Ladin is very much at the top of CIA's priority list. Because of his iconic stature, his death or capture clearly would have a significant impact on the confidence of his followers, both core al-Qa’ida and these unaffiliated extremists, unaffiliated extremists throughout the world.
This is an organization that has never been through a change at the top. For 20 years, bin Ladin has been the visionary, the inspirational and harmonizing force behind al-Qa’ida. Whether his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, could maintain unity in the ranks is a genuinely legitimate question. The truth is, we simply don't know what would happen if bin Ladin is killed or captured, but I'm willing to bet that, whatever happens, it would work in our favor.
Killing, capturing, disrupting al-Qa’ida's senior leaders, wherever they may find or seek sanctuary, is absolutely essential in thwarting attacks on the West. That's the key lesson from 9/11. Our understanding of this enemy and what it will take to defeat him changed on that day.
Never before have we faced an enemy so completely committed to our destruction and so completely irresponsible with human life. Al-Qa’ida is willing to sacrifice both its own operatives and the Muslims for whom it professes to fight.
This enemy, unprecedented in our history, requires a response that also has no model in our past. Let me remind you, one of the defining objectives of al-Qa’ida's theory of war is to erase the distinction between combatant and non- combatant, for themselves and for their victims alike. And that distinction between combatant and non-combatant has been an inviolate distinction in the laws and morals of the civilized world.
And so this war presents us with operational, ethical, and legal challenges that we as a nation have not faced before. And at CIA, we have been at the center of this nation's response to that challenge, using our full authorities and our most advanced capabilities, always within law, always with executive and congressional oversight. Doing anything less than playing to the full extent of our authorities and our capabilities would be a failure to live up to the oath we took, which is to defend the nation.
I'm extremely proud that our efforts, together with those of the military, law enforcement, and our foreign partners, have yielded results, results in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Indonesia, and even in the world of ideas. I'm encouraged by the progress that's being made in South Asia today. And I'm grateful for the talent and dedication of the thousands of CIA officers involved in this fight.
Their work has helped us to disrupt many attacks, including one that would have rivaled the destruction of 9/11. But I'm also acutely aware that al-Qa’ida remains the most dangerous threat we face.
The men and women of CIA live with that awareness every hour of every day. They're working around the clock and in every part of the world to defeat al-Qa’ida, to win this war, and to keep America and our allies safe.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here. Now I'll be quite happy to take your questions.
FRED KEMPE, PRESIDENT OF THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL: Thank you, General Hayden. And let me just say, on behalf of the Atlantic Council, I'm Fred Kempe, the president of the Atlantic Council, that was worth waiting for. Thank you for giving us a rich insight into the state of al-Qa’ida, I think, with a lot of new information, as well.
To simplify, in terms of asking my first question -- and then we'll go to the audience -- Pakistan, you're saying that al-Qa’ida is still the most dangerous threat and essentially you're saying Pakistan is the most dangerous place. And I suppose one would have said that about Afghanistan ahead of 9/11, if one had thought about it then.
Is that right? And if that's right, what happened with our relationship with our strategic ally in the war on terror, General Musharraf? What happened during that period of time? And what do we have to do different now that we didn't do then?
HAYDEN: Well, what we did then and what we are doing now, number one, is working with our Pakistani partners.
The first thing I need to point out, as challenging as the current circumstances are -- and I think broadly we and our Pakistani allies agree on the challenges -- as challenging as the current situation is, we have killed or captured more members of al-Qa’ida, more of the al-Qa’ida senior leadership in partnership with our Pakistani allies than we have with any other partner around the world. And so that needs to be stated upfront and very clearly.
The tribal region of Pakistan looks simple from about 9,000 miles away. The closer you get to it, the more complex the questions become. And I think what happened in 2006, that the government in Islamabad made a decision that we, absent the imminence of the threat, absent the development of al-Qa’ida, would have viewed to be as wise and far-reaching, which was, in essence, to invest in a long-term strategy of development and gradual incorporation of the tribal regions into Pakistan.
You have to understand, historically, the reach of the central government into these areas has been weak at best. And so the Pakistani government in 2006 began to pull back a bit, the peace agreement that I mentioned in my remarks being one element of it. And, again, we would have viewed it to be as patient and wise and far-seeing, absent the immediate threat.
But our enemies -- and the antecedent of "our" is the United States and Pakistan and Afghanistan -- but our enemies took advantage of that respite, took advantage of that breathing space to build up the kind of safe haven that I described in my remarks.
And now the question becomes, how do we deal with that? And you've got the Pakistanis -- again, I need to point out very strongly, I mean, multi- brigade operations in Bajaur, tough fighting against hardened militants, and they're staying there fighting, and fighting against -- against people by any definition are our common enemies.
KEMPE: And relatively newly doing that on that scale?
HAYDEN: That's -- absolutely. Absolutely.
KEMPE: One question before going to the audience. And when you do ask your questions, identify yourselves and put a question mark at the end of what you say.
Just to save people a little bit of trouble who are here from the media, you and the Director of National Intelligence, McConnell, have offered to stay on. What have you heard from the people who would have to answer you.
HAYDEN: OK, three minutes into the Q&A period, and...
KEMPE: Well, we'll get this part done and then we'll be able to focus on what I would say is the news. I think what you've said about Pakistan is quite important.
HAYDEN: No, very frankly, I mean, I'll let Admiral McConnell speak for himself, but I think he shares my view. We clearly serve at the pleasure of the president. Admiral McConnell is a senior intelligence adviser to the president. There has to be a personal relationship between the president and that person. And I think that perhaps for the Director of CIA, as well. So we fully understand that this is a decision for the president.
I think what Admiral McConnell has said that -- and as Arnold suggested in his earlier comments -- we think we're doing some things well. If asked to stay, I think both of us would seriously consider it. But this is truly something -- this is the business of the transition team, the business of the president-elect. And I would leave it there for now.
KEMPE: OK, thank you very much.
QUESTION: Could you discuss two other aspects of the al-Qa’ida situation, number one, the al-Qa’ida-Taliban relationship as it currently stands -- we're talking apparently with some factions of Taliban about an agreement in which they might even come into a coalition government in Afghanistan -- and, secondly, the role of the opium and heroin trade in the financing of the insurgency and what are some of the things that you could say about what's being done about that and other financial disruptions?
HAYDEN: Let me talk about the second question first.
Clearly, one of the most disruptive elements in the situation in Afghanistan today is the drug trade. I mean, you've got two countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, many parallels between the two, about the same size physically, about the same size geographically. Both of them have one major export. The one's legal, it's oil. The other one's not, and it's a product of the -- of the opium fields.
And I think all of us agree that there are several things that are preconditions to success in Afghanistan, and one of them is what you just raised, getting a grip on the growth of opium, the trade of opium, which feeds a whole bunch of things, all of them bad. It feeds a global drug issue. It feeds instability and corruption inside the Afghan government. And it actually does, as you suggest, fund the Taliban.
Your first question has been an interesting development. It's something that we saw coming that was probably crystallized about a year ago. And that is the merger -- and I try to suggest it in my prepared remarks -- the merger of Pashtun separatists and Pashtun extremists into a functioning operational alliance with the foreigners in the FATA represented by al-Qa’ida.
The proximate cause for that was probably the activity a summer ago, when the Pakistani government moved against the Red Mosque. And if you'll recall, a month or two after that action, bin Ladin called for warfare, open warfare against the Pakistani government. At that point -- and, look, there are no right angles in the real world here, all right, and there are no absolutes -- but at that point, it began to get increasingly clear to us that in addition to this being a threat from Pakistan, this was now a threat to Pakistan. And that Pakistan, rather than being a base of operations for al-Qa’ida, Pakistan writ large had become a target for al-Qa’ida.
And when you see the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, for example, the best intelligence we have is, is that effort was a blend of al-Qa’ida and Baitullah Mahsud. And Baitullah Mahsud is a Pashtun separatist, native of Pakistan, not a foreign fighter. That's been the new development. And that, I think, is the issue that's been most troubling. And what we have to do is, in essence, deconstruct that merger, deconstruct that alliance.
KEMPE: You spoke also of Western operatives. Can you say more about that?
HAYDEN: I can. I mean, without getting into too much detail, al-Qa’ida puts a great premium on bringing people into the FATA for orientation, indoctrination, and training, a great premium especially on people who are Western, you know, Western in their upbringing, Western in their outlook, Western in their appearance. And it's clear to us the reason for that is to make use of them against targets in the West.
KEMPE: Thank you.
QUESTION: Right at the end of your speech, you said something that intrigued me. I think we all know what the legal challenges have been, because we've spent a great deal of time reporting on them, but I'm wondering, looking back on the time that you've spent there, what have been a couple examples of an operational challenge and an ethical challenge that you've struggled with?
HAYDEN: I think the ethical challenges are tucked into the legal structure, you know, most, I think most clearly.
And the operational challenges -- and bear with me. It's going to be a bit of a long answer. But when we think about, where's our space? Where do we work, all right? And it's kind of in the space of what's technologically possible, what's operationally relevant -- I mean, is it useful to do -- and then what's legal, what's within our authorities. So the legal question actually has a controlling authority, so to speak, over the range of operational possibilities that we can use. And that's what I was trying to suggest.
And, frankly, the legal structures under which we are working in the West present great challenges to us because there's a body of thought that wants to describe this as a law enforcement issue and a body of thought that wants to describe it as a war. And focusing exclusively on either one of those lenses doesn't work. It becomes a blend. But our legal structures aren't really accustomed to working inside that blend.
I'll give you maybe a too stark example. And here it's more international than it is within the United States. I said we are a nation at war. I said we strongly believe that. I try to emphasize in that in my remarks. There are two or three other sentences I usually say. We are a nation at war. This war is global in its scope. We can only fulfill our duty in that war -- that is, defeat the enemy and defend our citizens and the citizens of allied nations - - by taking that fight, taking that war to our enemy wherever he may be.
Three sentences. It's a war; it's global in scope; we have to take the fight to the enemy wherever he may be. I would offer you the view that there are very few governments in the world that would agree with all three of those sentences. I believe them to be absolutely correct. I believe them to be ethically and legally sound. But we are working with an international legal structure that I think would have even our best friends, even people who are mostly like-minded, they're willing to discuss each of those three sentences with us and the legitimacy of each.
Those are the kinds of challenges we're working under. And I think what I try to stress is it’s an agency like CIA that's out there on the cutting edge of those kinds of questions all of the time because that's the space in which a nation's secret intelligence service works.
QUESTION: Could you give us your assessment of al-Qa’ida's current capabilities in bio-warfare? And could you comment on whether you consider the 2001 anthrax mailings as a serious possibility that they were the work of al-Qa’ida?
HAYDEN: I'll have to defer on the second question to what the Bureau has said. I know Bob Mueller has talked about this, but just particularly since they were, you know, moving to resolution of that case.
It is clear to us that -- and, again, I'm limited somewhat by classification, but what I can share is it is clear to us that the intent for weapons of mass destruction -- and it's across bio, chem, and nuclear -- is unarguable. We see that in multiple strands of reporting. The good news is that in some of those higher-end weapons, that that's hard to achieve. The bad news is that there are some lower-end weapons that are not, and that represents a great danger to us. And our belief is -- and, you know, a lot of this is reporting, and some of it's assessment, but it all comes wrapped with a high- confidence level. If al-Qa’ida could do it, they would. And so it's something we pay great attention to.
QUESTION: The president has recently spoken about the transition as being a time of particular vulnerability. The president-elect has spoken about the possibility of an early test of the new administration. In my country, Lord West has spoken about a new threat bubbling up. I wonder if you could just explain some of the context of those remarks and tell us whether we've really got something to be worried about at the moment.
HAYDEN: Sure. We had a chat earlier right before we came in here, myself and another gentleman, about this very thing. And he pointed out two data points, the attacks in 2001 and the attacks in 1993. I would add that, for some people, two data points create a trend line. For others, there may be a bit more hesitation to call that a trend line.
I guess I'd introduce another factor into this, as well. I tried to give you an accurate picture of al-Qa’ida. This is not an omnipotent enemy. This is an enemy whose actions we can affect by the actions that we take. And I tried to give you a picture that, in many ways, we've been taking those actions and keeping them off balance, so that even if al-Qa’ida had this strong wish to do something between Date X and Date Y, it's another thing to do it, beyond just the wish.
So I think we need to keep those kinds of things in mind. That said, I mean, there's a clear historical pattern that, during a transition, as governments are forming, people are becoming accustomed to what they're doing and who else is doing it, decision-making may theoretically be slower than it is one, two or three years later. That's why we've received very clear direction that we're going to make this the smoothest transition in recorded history, so that we can get the new team, whomever they might be, as they're named, up to speed as quickly as possible so that there's no diminution in the ability of the republic to defend itself.
QUESTION: General, I’ve heard recently some put forward the proposition, to follow up on your comment that al-Qa’ida is not monolithic here, that, in fact, it might be possible to separate the Taliban and al-Qa’ida, and turn them against al-Qa’ida with some sort of diplomatic approach.
And another element of this is that we're perhaps making a mistake by paying much attention to that Pakistan-Afghanistan border, which isn't real on the ground in any event, and that we might be pushing the war into Pakistan rather than keeping the war out of Afghanistan, and that a different approach to the al-Qa’ida-Taliban thing might offer a solution to both of those problems.
HAYDEN: Great question. And, actually, it follows up on a question asked earlier, and I didn't completely answer it.
First, the Taliban. If we were parsing Taliban as a part of speech, I think we'd have an honest debate as to whether it was a singular noun, a collective noun, or a plural noun. And depending on how you do that might shape your policy approach. I think we might, certainly in our common discourse, I hope not so much in our professional discourse, but in our common discourse might be a bit too facile in spreading a Taliban label across a whole variety of populations.
And so I think what's implied in your question is certainly true and worth exploring, that you can hive off some of these groups and that some are more or less dangerous than others. Some are more or less committed, some are more or less your friends or more or less your enemies, and a realistic appreciation of that is an important tool in the toolbox of a nation like ourselves or Pakistan going forward.
I'd also underscore -- and, of course, the model that's brought up in Anbar, where we did something similar, and there are similarities and there are differences between Anbar province in Iraq and what goes on in the tribal region. But in Anbar, we did accept the premise that we could talk to people who had recently been shooting at us as long as we could arrange something in the future that was quite different from what was going on in the past. So that does offer us opportunities.
What you had in Anbar, though, was security. You were able to provide these groups with sufficient security to make decisions based on their own self- interest that more comported with your vision for the future. Until we can provide security in the tribal region, that effort is much, much more difficult there. But it remains a distinct possibility. We'd be foolish not to include that in our approach to the region. And to be very candid, doing it from Washington or doing it with an American lens is probably not going to be all that successful. Here's an element where our Pakistani allies are far more sensitive to experience with the realities on the ground.
QUESTION: General, I wanted to talk about the air strikes in specific. And are they having a measurable impact on al-Qa’ida that make it worth the diplomatic backlash and the political backlash within Pakistan? And then, secondly, did Pakistan's response to the ground raid in September have an impact such that that sort of tactic would unlikely to be repeated?
HAYDEN: There are a lot of things that I can't comment on in any way. I would share with you, though, that General Pasha, who is essentially my counterpart inside the Pakistani government, head of ISI, visited us a few weeks ago for three days. We had long, productive discussions, friendly discussions with General Pasha. I think it's fair to say that we've got a common view of the threat. And I think there's a lot more commonality on how the threat should be dealt with than many people seem to assume. And that, over the long term, success here is going to be defined by the success of Pakistani sovereignty over these regions. And that's something that a strong, powerful common interest for the two of us and that we would work to support.
KEMPE: There's been some talk about reliability of the ISI. Do the Pakistanis consider it reliable that you're talking about, or do they have some concerns about it, as well?
HAYDEN: I would never venture to try to judge anything like that. Again, I'd just simply repeat, we meet with ISI routinely. We have worked with them for some of the most significant successes in the war of terror, and we'll continue to work with them.
QUESTION: You said that AQI in Iraq is on the verge of strategic defeat, and I'm wondering if you can just expand a little bit more on the situation in Iraq. You have some of these foreign fighters that are still there, loosely under the al-Qa’ida in Iraq banner, some of them seeking sanctuary across the borders. I'm just wondering, you know, what -- sort of in a transition mindset...
HAYDEN: Sure. And, again, I'm afraid I can't give you that crisp, definitive answer, because there's probably not one available. But I can talk about some factors bearing.
Number one, the flow of foreign fighters is down, significantly down. You just don't see the number of people wanting to cross one or another border and go into Iraq and fight. I think there are a lot of reasons for that. I think it's the -- I'll say the fight in Iraq has lost its aura for a lot of al-Qa’ida adherents. And then there's just the, you know, pure, raw, physical security environment that we've been able to create with our Iraqi allies. I think both of those are very important things.
Now, that said, when you look -- and we asked our analysts to do this-- when you look at the history of these kinds of things, and you have an insurgency -- and, again, words escape us to accurately describe in one label exactly what is it, but I'll use the word "insurgency" for al-Qa’ida. When you look at the history of such movements, take the Malay rebellion, take the Huks in the Philippines, when you look at it over the long term, these things don't go out overnight. There is a long period in which there is considerable smoldering and the occasional shooting out of flames. And I suspect that that's probably what we'll see for al-Qa’ida in Iraq for a long period of time.
And in each of those cases, with the Huks and with the Malay rebellion, it's just not the security services, but the growth of governance, the growth of providing services to the population that ultimately lead to their demise. So I don't want you to get the -- strategic defeat I believe in. I'm not backing away from that at all. But this is going to go for a long time before it's just out all together.
QUESTION: Going back to your statement that al-Qa’ida operating out of Pakistan is the greatest danger to the United States, and then you said that, if there is a major strike in this country, it will bear al-Qa’ida's fingerprints. Just to clarify that, are you saying Al-Qa’ida in Pakistan -- it would bear the fingerprints of al-Qa’ida in Pakistan as opposed to the Islamic Maghreb? And what does that say about sort of the non-al-Qa’ida Jihadi movements around the world. You're really, it sounds like you're really narrowing it down to al-Qa’ida and Pakistan.
HAYDEN: And I have to preface my answer with, you don't know what you don't know. But dealing with what I do know, all the threats we have to the West have a thread that takes them back to the tribal region along the Af-Pak border. And it may be training; it may be command and control; it may be financing. But there is at least one, and in some cases many threads that take them back to there, and that's why I chose to focus on it as much as I did in my remarks.
QUESTION: General, I wanted to ask you to say a few more words about how you would characterize the Pashtun. I understand that they're the dominant cultural influence in the region, particularly in FATA. But at one time, if I understand correctly, back in the late '80s, we were able to align their interests with our interests. Is that still possible to do that in that region? And sort of a subpart of that, has al-Qa’ida been able to subjugate or to incorporate Pashtuns' objectives with theirs in that region?
HAYDEN: In answer to the first question, can we envisage a future in which Pashtun objectives comport with our own? And I think the answer is absolutely yes. I mean, there's nothing intrinsic in our worldview or their worldview, even our strategic needs, their perceived strategic needs, that would preclude that. So that's one.
This merging of al-Qa’ida and Pashtun extremism or Pashtun separatism has been building for a while. It is very complex. It's not something that's easily understood from a distance. I almost liken it, and I don't mean to trivialize this, but, you know, any of you who've grown up in a big city and know that there are certain unofficial organizations called gangs that have sway here, have sway there, have sway over here, and the relationships and alliances among those are very difficult to understand by an outsider, even if the outsider there is defined as the local police force, you know, someone who's accustomed to living in the area, can actually read the street signs and speak the language. So there are a lot of subtleties to this that we and our Pakistani and Afghan allies have to master. But there's nothing that precludes that.
Al Qaeda has been, as I tried to point out in my remarks, has been successful. They've been there for a while. The Arabs in Al Qaeda have been very respectful of local custom. And we have the custom of Pashtunwali, which is hospitality for guests, that is very strong. And the Arabs in Al Qaeda have been respectful of that. And so we're now seeing intermarriage and a whole linkage of folks who, you know, perhaps, don't know or don't care what Al Qaeda's strategic objectives are, just know that they are their guests and that their culture requires certain norms of behavior.
Other foreigners in the tribal region, Uzbeks, Chechens, and others, have not nearly been as respectful of local custom. And they are not nearly as welcome. So, again, the more of learn about the complexity of the situation, the more you learn about angles and advantages that you can exploit. But, ultimately, there's nothing that precludes success here.
Someone talked earlier, I think it was Jan talking about, you know, we talk about the Pashtuns, and they're divided by what some was suggest is the artificial line or the Duran Line. I can only tell you, it didn't seem artificial when I talk to our Afghan friends or our Pakistani friends. That seems to be quite a significant line that they've drawn there. And that simply makes it more complex because the local identity doesn't view that line in the same way that mapmakers in Kabul or Islamabad or in Washington might view it.
KEMPE: General Hayden, let me ask you a last question as we're running out of time.
What's the most important single thing that you've learned in this job that you would want to pass on to your successor or should not have a successor, pass on to yourself? And maybe part of that could be you fixed a lot in a lot of places. You fixed a lot at the NSA when you were there, and it came out a better place. I think people are saying that about you very clearly of the CIA as well. What's one thing you were unable to fix that you would say should be fixed in the next administration?
HAYDEN: Actually, you asked me two questions. And I want to take my freedom and answer the first one because I don't want to answer the second. And the first was simply what's the raw advice.
KEMPE: Yes.
HAYDEN: OK. Intelligence is very, very hard. And when you hold it up to an absolute scale, it always fails. I had one group much smaller than this once ask me on a scale of zero to ten, how would you rate CIA's analytic capacity? And I answered that the first thing I have to tell you is seven, eight, nine, and ten are not on our scale. Because if you're at seven, eight, nine, or ten, they aren't asking us the question. We get the different kind of question. The one with a lot more ambiguity. The one that is a cross between a secret and a mystery. OK? And so that's the challenge we work under. So, one, you need to know that.
Two, I actually believe that the wealth the American taxpayer has given us, the guidance we've gotten from our political leadership, and the White House and in the Congress, has created a pretty good organization. I don't mean just CIA. I mean the entire intelligence community. And one of the things we're flogged about fairly routinely is sharing of information. And so I've taken a little parlor game when I get that kind of homily from people. I said, OK, I've got it. We have to share information better. Now, help me with this. Fill in the blank. Finish this sentence for me. You guys don't share information well enough. You should be more like the...
And there is no name, no country that fits that blank and makes that sentence true.
So my point is if we were marking on the curve, I'd really feel good about life. But life doesn't mark us on the curve. Life marks us on an absolute scale, particularly, for an intelligence community. With all that in mind, I would pass on to those coming in that this community has been inspected, investigated, reviewed and commissioned to death for the last six or seven years. The metaphor I use is they wonder how we're growing so come in, grab us, pull us up by the roots, and say well they're not growing fast enough and put us back down with the effect that would be obvious.
I would say this. The structure we current have is fine. It's good enough. Good people can make it work. Is it perfect? No. Nothing's perfect. But this can work. So I would simply offer the advice pick people to head these structures who have the competence to govern complex organizations and who have the confidence of the political leadership. And then just let them go and go do things. Modifications, changes in size of the staff here, little change in responsibilities there, fine. But another major look, another major restructuring, I think, would be catastrophic for the community.
So if you're asking one piece of advice, pick good people to lead this, people you trust, people you think have the talent to do it, give them their mission, and let them work, broadly speaking, within the current structure.
KEMPE: And don't pull up the roots. Before I thank you, General Hayden, I just want to thank a couple of other people. First of all, I do want to thank General Punaro, who's a member of our board and also SAIC for supporting our work on global intelligence where we're really trying to understand what’s going on across the Atlantic and also help understanding where we can. And I think you've really helped us tonight, General Hayden.
The second thing is I'd like to thank General Scowcroft. I want to tell my staff, I did not write his opening comments where he praised the Atlantic Council and our work. But, as our chairman of the international advisory board, it's a great compliment coming from you. And thank you so much. Finally, I want to tip the hat to the vice president of the Atlanta Council, Jim Townsend, and his action officer for this series, Magnus Nordenman, who really put all this together.
And then, finally, General Hayden, this was really a rich conversation. It was a wonderful presentation on your part. I think we're all going home with a lot to digest and a lot of new insights. Thank you for taking the time, sir.